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EQUALITY, PROCEDURAL JUSTICE, AND THE
WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION
ADAM S. CHILTON & RYAN W. DAVIS*
1. Introduction
How can a moral concern for equality be implemented within
international institutions? After several years of debate, legal
theorists and political philosophers have moved toward the view that
equality at least sometimes matters within international politics.'
Plenty of disagreement remains, but for this article we will take for
granted that equality is a political concern within at least some
international institutions.2 With surprisingly few exceptions, this is
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Philosophy, Harvard University (ryandavis@fas.harvard.edu). We would like to
thank Charles Beitz, Britt Cramer, Jessica Flanigan, Javier Hidalgo, Mareike
Kleine, Stephen Macedo, Melissa Lane, and Philip Pettit for helpful comments and
advice. Ryan Davis would also like to thank the Institute for Humane Studies for
financial support.
1 Thomas Nagel, The Problem of Global Justice, 33 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 113
(2005). This provocative piece sparked academic discussion of global justice. For
early and influential criticisms of Nagel, see A.J. Julius, Nagel's Atlas, 34 PHIL. &
PUB. AFF. 1 (2006); Joshua Cohen & Charles Sabel, Extra Rempublicam Nulla
Justitia?, 34 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 147 (2006). See also Arash Abizadeh,
Cooperation, Pervasive Impact, and Coercion: On the Scope (not Site) of
Distributive Justice, 35 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 318 (2007); Eric Cavallero, Coercion,
Inequality and the International Property Regime, 18 J. POL. PHIL. 16 (2010);
Andreas Follesdal, The Distributive Justice of a Global Basic Structure: A
Category Mistake?, 10 PHIL. POL. & ECoN. 46 (2011).
2 For those who deny that equality ever matters beyond the state, a position
we call statism, see DAviD MILLER, NATIONAL RESPONSIBILITY AND GLOBAL
JUSTICE (2007); Andrea Sangiovanni, Global Justice, Reciprocity, and the State,
35 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 3 (2007); Joseph Heath, Rawls on Global Distributive
Justice: A Defense, in GLOBAL JUSTICE, GLOBAL INSTITUTIONS 193 (Daniel
Weinstock ed., 2005); Samuel Freeman, The Law of Peoples, Social Cooperation,
Human Rights, and Distributive Justice, 23 SOC. PHIL. & POL'Y 29 (2006); JOHN
RAWLS, THE LAW OF PEOPLES (1999); Michael Blake, Distributive Justice, State
Coercion, and Autonomy, 30 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 257 (2002).
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where the debate has ended.3 Few scholars have considered how the
political concern for equality might differ when applied in
international rather than domestic settings, or how different
international institutions might require different kinds of egalitarian
principles.4
The lack of sustained attention is remarkable because the
legal and institutional implementation of a moral concern for
equality would, itself, involve a morally complicated process. At
least two reasons can account for this apparent implementation
difficulty. First, equality is a relational rather than a simple moral
good.5 A moral good is relational if the presence or the absence of
the good can only be understood by assessing allocation of some
resource among multiple persons. Equality is present when the
allocation of a resource across some set of persons provides each
with a relevantly similar share. In this way, equality differs from
goods that may be understood non-relationally. By hypothesis,
whether a person is healthy or sick is (at least in the first instance) a
non-relational fact, but whether a person is rich or poor is irreducibly
relational. Equality's relational aspect suggests that equality must be
understood from the point of view of legal and political institutions,
rather than from a first-personal moral point of view.
Second, identifying the equality of persons as morally
relevant is important for the design of legal institutions, but also
significantly indeterminate. 6 Not only does it fail to provide any
3 For notable exceptions, see Leif Wenar, Property Rights and the Resource
Curse, 36 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 2 (2008); THOMAS POGGE, WORLD POVERTY AND
HUMAN RIGHTS (2008).
4 But see RICHARD MILLER, GLOBALIZING JUSTICE: THE ETHICS OF POVERTY
AND POWER (2010); AARON JAMES, FAIRNESS IN PRACTICE: A SOCIAL CONTRACT
FOR THE GLOBAL ECONOMY (2012); Pogge, supra note 3; Wenar, supra note 3.
5 The locus classicus on this point is THOMAS NAGEL, MORTAL QUESTIONS
106-27 (1979). Nagel argues that equality is not involved in raising the absolute
level of goods a person enjoys, but in reducing the difference between those who
have more and those who have less. Id. Raising a person's absolute level may
sometimes be a means of promoting equality, but these issues are conceptually
distinct. Id. See also Derek Parfit, Equality and Priority, 10 RATIO 202 (1997)
(discussing more recent treatment of these issues).
6 For a relatively expansive view of the role of global justice, see Pogge,
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information about how to achieve the desired egalitarian distribution,
but it also fails to reveal what would even count as achieving it.
Does equality require equal possession of some resource, or an equal
share of some benefit, or an equal status or standing? Alternatively,
should egalitarian justice be aimed at securing agents with some type
of equal access to power or decision-making ability? In short, even
if the hard-won philosophical consensus that equality somehow
matters within international institutions is accepted, a range of
normative philosophical questions remain before the task of
facilitating justice can be handed over entirely to policy practitioners.
Although there is a growing literature on global justice,7 there may
be no single principle of justice that can be applied to every
international institution. Instead, there are a variety of localized facts
about how particular international legal and political institutions can
be structured justly.
In this paper, we will argue that there is no easy way to
confidently shift an egalitarian principle from one institutional
context to another. This is because there is no uniform basis for the
moral significance of equality. On received egalitarian accounts,
there is a plurality of considerations that support the moral
significance of equality, and these considerations may apply
differently in different institutional settings.8  Even if some
indeterminacy in application is inevitable, it might be hoped that we
can say more than just that equality does matter within some
international institutions. The purpose of this paper is to seek out
some more specific institutional guidance. Doing so requires
drawing from literature in economics and political science to
understand how inequality is connected to morally undesirable
supra note 3. For a more limited view of the role of global justice, see Mathias
Risse, How Does the Global Order Harm the Poor, 33 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 349
(2005). While Pogge believes that very serious reforms would be required to
prevent the global economic order from harming the poor, Risse is skeptical that
Pogge's counterfactual claims necessary to proving harms can be substantiated. Id.
7 See supra notes 2-4.
8 See, e.g., T.M. SCANLON, THE DIFFICULTY OF TOLERANCE 202-18 (2003);
CHARLES BEITZ, POLITICAL EQUALITY (1989); Martin O'Neill, What Should
Egalitarians Believe?, 36 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 119 (2008).
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conditions within international institutions.
Our theoretical thesis is that if an international institution
creates a risk of moral wrongdoing, such as coercion or deception,
then procedures ought to be implemented to protect agents from
these wrongs. Egalitarian procedures can help offer such protection.
Because this proposal treats equality as a valuable means to
preventing wrong actions, we will describe it as an instrumentalist
egalitarian account. This account can help illuminate how
international institutions, like the World Trade Organization (WTO)
can be reformed to promote the type of equality required by justice.
To illustrate this, we propose a series of informal proceduralist
reforms for the WTO, which we believe would capture the normative
benefits described in our theory. By so doing, we illustrate how a
localized theory of global justice might be developed and applied in
a particular international legal context.
We will proceed in the following way. First, in Part II we
describe equality as a norm of distributive justice within domestic
political contexts. We consider and reject the possibility of
exporting domestic egalitarian principles to international legal
institutions. Second, in Part III we assemble materials for a theory of
international egalitarian justice. We hold that the variety of
international contexts favors a procedural rather than substantive
approach. Third, in Part IV we develop a set of procedural
egalitarian norms for satisfying justice within the WTO. Finally, in
Part V we consider three policy level reforms that would help to
secure the procedural protections required by justice. Taken
together, we hope that this argument contributes to the theorization
of global justice and helps to demonstrate the possibility of building
a bridge from egalitarian principles to concrete reforms in
international institutions.
II. Domestic Egalitarianism
In this part we will first provide an overview of recent
developments with the literature on egalitarian justice at the level of
domestic political societies. Recent debate has centrally involved
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two kinds of equality-advancing proposals, one stemming from luck
egalitarianism, and the other from what might be termed the
democratic equality thesis. We describe how these proposals
provide different grounds for including equality among the
requirements of domestic justice. Second, we describe a simple
strategy for deriving an egalitarian principle of justice for
international institutions. That is, a strategy according to which the
same principle or principles of egalitarian justice that are supported
by one's preferred theory of domestic justice are also supposed to be
part of justice within some international domain or set of multi-
national institutions. Because this strategy redeploys the same
principles of justice from the domestic to the international setting, we
call it the exporting strategy. Finally, we suggest reasons for
skepticism about the exporting strategy's prospects for successfully
developing a theory of international justice. We conclude this
section by delineating between procedural and substantive egalitarian
theories.
A. Egalitarianism in Domestic Political Institutions
Many philosophers and legal scholars accept some form of
egalitarianism as part of a domestic theory of justice. 9 By including
it among the prescriptions of a "domestic theory of justice," we mean
to suggest that the securing of equality among citizens is an
appropriate use for the coercive political force of the state. 10 In
9 See infra text accompanying notes 12-17. For recent examples from legal
scholarship, see William S. Koski & Rob Reich, When Adequate Isn't: The Retreat
from Equity in Educational Law and Policy and Why It Matters, 56 EMORY L.J.
545 (2006); Michael Blake, The Discriminating Shopper, 43 SAN DIEGO L. REV.
1017 (2006); Greg M. Nielsen, For and Against John Rawls: Reflections on South-
North Citizenship, 17 FLA. J. INT'L L. 479 (2005).
10 JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 8-9 (1971). Rawls famously supposed
justice to the "first virtue" of social institutions, he wrote:
A conception of justice, then, is to be regarded as providing in
the first instance of a standard whereby the distributive aspects
of the basic structure of society are to be assessed . . . . A
complete conception defining principles for all the virtues of the
2012]
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general, justice is characterized by a set of political rights
distinguishable from other moral claims by the fact that their
coercive enforcement is either morally required, or at least morally
permissible.'1  A domestic theory of justice is egalitarian if it
involves a specific, politically enforceable concern for securing
equality of some good among citizens. Philosophers have proposed
a variety of possible goods whose equal distribution might be a
source of moral concern. These include, for example, equality in
resources,12 equality in capabilities,1 3 equality in opportunity,
14
equality in welfare or well-being,'5 equality in freedom,'6 or equality
in access to political power.' 7 We will not concern ourselves here
with addressing the correct currency of egalitarianism-that is, the
answer to the question, "Equality of what?"1 8 Nor will we address
first-order moral theories that attribute a kind of equality to
persons-for example, equal moral status or significance-but do
not involve specifically egalitarian commitments within the theory of
political justice. Our purpose in this section is instead to describe
two types of grounds for a norm of equality within the theory of
basic structure, together with their respective weights when they
conflict, is more than a conception of justice; it is a social ideal.
The principles of justice are but a part, although perhaps the
most important part, of such a conception.
id.
" See Jeremy Waldron, The Primacy of Justice, 9 LEGAL THEORY 269 (2003).
12 See, e.g., Ronald Dworkin, What is Equality? Part 1: Equality of
Welfare, 10 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 185 (1981).
13 See, e.g., AMARTYA SEN, THE IDEA OF JUSTICE (2009).
14 See, e.g., RAWLS, supra note 10; Richard Arneson, Against Rawlsian
Equality of Opportunity, 93 PHIL. STUD. 77 (1999).
15 See, e.g., ROBERT GOODIN, UTILITARIANISM AS A PUBLIC PHILOSOPHY
(1995); Ronald Dworkin, What is Equality? Part 2: Equality of Resources, 10
PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 283 (1981).
16 See, e.g., Hillel Steiner, The Natural Right to Equal Freedom, 83 MIND 194
(1974).
17 See, e.g., David Estlund, Political Quality, 17 SOC. PHIL. & POL'Y 127
(2000); Elizabeth Anderson, What is the Point of Equality?, 109 ETHICS 287
(1999).
18 Amartya Sen, Equality of What?, in THE TANNER LECTURE ON HUMAN
VALUES 198 (Sterling McMurrin ed., 1980).
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justice. Clarifying the potential bases for egalitarian theories will be
important to investigating how egalitarian theories might be
subsequently applied to international legal institutions, including the
WTO.
Beginning with Rawls's acclaimed A Theory of Justice,
egalitarian-minded political philosophers have located the basis for
equality primarily through one of two basic strategies, which we will
identify as luck-egalitarian and democratic equality.19 Interpreters
in both traditions have traced both strategies to Rawls's book,
although such findings have been controversial.2 We will describe
them in turn.
Luck egalitarians distinguish between two kinds of fortune:
21option luck and brute luck. Option luck involves outcomes that
result from deliberate, voluntary choices in which the results of the
22choices are known to be partly determined by chance. When
someone gambles on a game of dice, their losing may be bad luck,
but it is bad luck of their own making. Brute luck involves outcomes
that are in no respect the result of deliberate choices.23 If someone
contracts a rare disease, they suffer from bad brute luck, even though
they took no action to occasion incurring the risk of this outcome.
The luck egalitarian view holds that inequalities that result from bad
brute luck are unfair.24 If one citizen of a political community has
much less than another, but to no fault of her own, this seems
19 See RAWLS, supra note 10. The term "luck egalitarian" was coined by
Anderson, supra note 17, whose contrasting view presents an early version of the
democratic equality thesis.
20 See Norman Daniels, Democratic Equality: Rawls's Complex
Egalitarianism, in THE CAMBRIDGE COMPANION TO RAWLS 241 (Samuel Freeman
ed., 2003); S. L. HURLEY, JUSTICE, LUCK AND KNOWLEDGE (2003).
21 This distinction was originally formulated by Ronald Dworkin. For
discussion, see RONALD DWORKIN, SOVEREIGN VIRTUE 73-77 (2000).
22 Id. at 73.
23 Id.
24 Discussions of luck egalitarianism include Richard Arneson, Luck
Egalitarianism: An Interpretation and Defense, 32 PHIL. TOPICs 1 (2006); G.A.
Cohen, Luck and Equality: A Reply to Hurley, 72 PHIL. & PHENOMENOLOGICAL
RES. 439 (2006); ANDREW MASON, LEVELING THE PLAYING FIELD: THE IDEA OF
EQUAL OPPORTUNITY AND ITS PLACE IN EGALITARIAN THOUGHT (2006).
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intuitively unacceptable. Luck egalitarians rely on intuitions that
recoil against disparities in health care, education or other goods
when these disparities result from seemingly morally arbitrary facts:
where a person was born, their race or gender, or the wealth of their
family. It is wrong, according to luck egalitarianism, for some
people to have more while others have less, but not for any reason
connected to their own effort or desert. Such arbitrary inequalities
constitute the essence of unfairness. 25  The luck egalitarian
prescription, in turn, is to neutralize the effects of brute luck, while
allowing the effects of option luck. Because the consequences of bad
brute luck can be difficult for single individuals to correct (think of
the effects of an unforeseeable natural disaster), only the political
state is equipped to address the disparities of bad luck in a justice-
satisfying way.
Although luck egalitarianism is still defended by some, it is
perhaps no longer the dominant expression of distributive justice
within the philosophical literature. Luck egalitarianism seemed to
some at once too concerned with the source of inequality, and
insufficiently attentive to inequality's morally objectionable
consequences. Even when inequalities result from option luck (that
is, the voluntary choices of persons), they still might have
consequences that were appropriate for public concern.27  In
addition, the conception of fairness crucial to the success of the luck
egalitarian proposal seems open to objection. Luck egalitarianism
supposes that any arbitrary (because unchosen) difference is
objectionable on fairness grounds, but this use seems to demand
more than can be given by a plausible theory of fairness. 28 It is not
unfair for an athlete to win a race, even if she has unusual physical
gifts which she did not deserve or choose. 29 Moreover, standards of
fairness seem localized to particular domains and institutional
25 For a sustained development of this view, see G.A. COHEN, RESCUING
JUSTICE AND EQUALITY (2008).
26 See id.
27 See Anderson, supra note 17.
28 This argument is developed by Susan Hurley. See HURLEY, supra note 20.
29 See Samuel Scheffler, What is Egalitarianism?, 31 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 5
(2003).
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settings, and so it may be difficult to locate a fundamental norm of
fairness as broadly applicable as that conception presupposed by luck
egalitarian views.
Skepticisms of this sort have pressed distributive liberals into
pursuing a conception of egalitarianism without so much normative
machinery. What has emerged is the democratic equality thesis,
which holds that liberal democracies should include provisions for
social equality as a means to securing a kind of equality of
citizenship.3 0 Differences in access to wealth, education, or positions
of prestige or political power might undermine the ability of some to
participate as equals in a liberal democracy. However, liberal
philosophy has long supposed that a democratic right to participate
would be compromised if participation could not be carried out in an
atmosphere of equality for all citizens. 31 In other words, if some
have superior rights to others in their control of state power, then the
rights of those with less control would be violated by that very
difference. Thus, equality (understood in terms of the allocation of
political power) supplies a kind of precondition for democratic
rights. In addition, democratic theorists have supposed that there are
morally relevant goods associated with sustaining relationships of
32
equality with other citizens. Relationships in which other citizens
are respected as co-authors of the law can only be sustained in the
presence of certain basic types of equality (the details of which have
been tabled for present purposes).33 The basic point is that the
democratic equality thesis recommends modes of equality that will
protect rights associated with democratic participation, or else
sustain morally valuable political relationships within the democratic
political community.
30 See Samuel Scheffler, Choice, Circumstance, and the Value of Equality, 4
POL. PHIL. & ECON. 1 (2005). See also Anderson, supra note 17.
31 See generally RAWLS, supra note 10. See also Joshua Cohen, Democratic
Equality, 99 ETHics 727 (1989).
32 See, e.g., Scheffler, supra note 30. See also Scanlon, supra note 8; O'Neill,
supra note 8.
33 This idea of citizenships as legal "co-authorship" is from RAWLS, The Idea
of Public Reason Revisited, in THE LAW OF PEOPLES 131, 152-56 (1999). See also
John Rawls, The Idea of Public Reason Revisited, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 765 (1997).
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B. Exporting Domestic Theories to International Institutions
Luck egalitarianism and democratic equality are both theories
that provide support for why equality should be included within a
theory of justice. They leave open the question of exactly how an
egalitarian principle ought to be formulated. Since the
considerations that they identify as morally important differ, it would
be natural to suppose that the specific egalitarian principles they
would support would also differ in content and extension. In
general, democratic equality might target a narrower range of
inequalities which implicate political activity. Luck egalitarians
might be more interested in a broad array of inequalities and focus
instead on identifying facts about their causal history.
34
Nevertheless, luck egalitarians and democratic equality theorists may
converge in their first-order political prescriptions. For example,
Rawls's difference principle, according to which any departure from
equality in primary goods should be to the advantage of the least well
off, has been supported by both luck egalitarians and defenders of
democratic equality.
35
Although the differing conceptions of egalitarian justice at
the domestic level may thus recommend convergent political
programs, there is a real question about how equality-based
considerations can be transferred from the domestic to the
international level. Because the grounds of equality are much better
developed domestically than internationally, it would be helpful in
the development of an international distributive theory if resources
from domestic distributive justice could be fruitfully borrowed and
reused. However, the forgoing discussion of luck egalitarianism and
democratic equality has revealed that there are multiple, divergent
34 Kok-Chor Tan, The Boundary of Justice and the Justice of Boundaries:
Defending Global Egalitarianism, 19 CAN. J. L. & JURIS. 319 (2006). Extending
the luck egalitarian intuition to the global setting, Tan writes, "[s]o if distributive
justice is motivated by the need to mitigate the effects of contingencies that are
'arbitrary from a moral point of view' on people's life chances, this presents a
consideration also for global distributive equality." Id. at 319.
35 For a description of the continuing appeal of Rawls's theory of justice as
fairness, see Paula Casal, Is Sufficiency Enough? 117 ETHicS 296 (2007).
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bases on which an egalitarian theory may be developed. It is, of
course, far from obvious that any given explanation of the moral
significance of equality will apply in any international context in the
same way that it applies in a domestic context. How, for example,
could one distinguish option luck from brute luck in institutions
regulating international trade? Alternatively, what kind of
relationships might count as morally valuable within international
organizations in a way analogous to those of "citizen co-legislators"
in a single political system?
Perhaps the simplest way of utilizing resources from
domestic political theory to construct an international theory of
justice would be to borrow them directly. Here is one strategy you
might use to decide on a determinate egalitarian principle to apply to
the international institution: determine what egalitarian principle or
principles apply within the state, and then adopt those same
principles for the international institution. We call this the exporting
strategy. The exporting strategy recommends that if you believe
equality matters within the WTO, and you believe that equality of
opportunity should be promoted within the United States, then you
should also favor adopting equality of opportunity as an egalitarian
principle for the WTO. Whatever egalitarian principles our preferred
domestic theory of justice recommends should simply be exported to
all international environments in which equality is a political
concern.
36The exporting strategy has a simple appeal. It reduces the
question of what international egalitarian principles should be
adopted to the question of what egalitarian principles should be
adopted within the state. This is helpful because it allows us to
answer an unfamiliar problem with the same solution already in hand
from a more familiar problem. For the exporting strategy, there are
two important questions: "When is equality a political concern?" and
"What is the true egalitarian principle?" Once the master egalitarian
principle is uncovered, all that is left to do is apply it to all
institutions in which equality matters.
It should not be surprising, then, that much recent
36 See generally DARREL MOELLENDORF, COSMOPOLITAN JUSTICE (2002).
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argumentation about international egalitarianism has proceeded as if
the exporting hypothesis is true. 37 For example, Thomas Nagel's
near-canonical paper frames the issue as one of whether equality
should matter internationally, as if the primary question for theories
of global justice was to settle whether there was an analogy between
the political state and the international political environment.
38
Nagel wonders, "[W]hat is the characteristic in virtue of which
[institutions besides the state] create obligations of justice and
presumptions in favor of equal consideration for all those
individuals? 3 9  The question of whether egalitarian norms apply
outside the state presupposes we have a set of distributive principles
already in hand, and that we must determine the range of their
application. 40  But that is only true if the exporting strategy is
correct-that is, if the same norms that apply in domestic law can be
redeployed with minimal revision to domains governed by
international legal bodies.
37 See Pietro Maffettone, The WTO and the Limits of Distributive Justice, 35
PHIL. & SOC. CRITICISM 243 (2009); Robert Hockett, Three (Potential) Pillars of
Transnational Economic Justice: The Bretton Woods Institutions as Guarantors of
Global Equal Treatment and Market Competition, 36 METAPHILOSOPHY 93
(2005); Darrel Moellendorf, The World Trade Organization and Egalitarian
Justice, 36 METAPHILOSOPHY 145 (2005).
38 Nagel, supra note 1.
31 Id. at 142.
40 In a passage that has provoked much subsequent literature, Nagel writes,
A sovereign state is not just a cooperative enterprise for mutual
advantage. The societal rules determining its basic structure are
coercively imposed: it is not a voluntary association. I submit
that it is this complex fact-that we are both putative joint
authors of the coercively imposed system, and subject to its
norms, i.e., expected to accept their authority even when the
collective decision diverges from our personal preferences-that
creates the special presumption against arbitrary inequalities in
our treatment by the system. Id. at 128-29.
Responses to Nagel include Julius, supra note 1; Cohen & Sabel, supra note 1;
Abizadeh, supra note 1; Aaron James, Distributive Justice Without Sovereign
Rule: The Case of Trade, 31 Soc. THEORY & PRAC. 533 (2005).
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C. Why Exporting is Not Promising
Despite its intuitive appeal, the exporting strategy's elegance
is too good to be true. Just because equality is a political concern
within two different institutions, it does not follow that it will be a
concern in the same way, or to the same extent. For example, it
might be unfair for parents not to provide their children with equal
opportunity, but it might not be unfair (or at least, less unfair) for
different families to focus to varying degrees on using resources to
enhance the opportunities their children enjoy. There may be some
views, such as certain luck egalitarian views, that deny this.4 1 For
example, if you believe that all humans are owed equality of
opportunity with any other human, then the equality of opportunity
principle will be exportable. But in this case, exporting is of no
significance, since the principle applies globally in the first instance
anyway.42
Once the grounds (or considerations that favor adopting) of a
given egalitarian principle are understood, then the exporting
strategy begins to look less plausible. Suppose democratic equality
theorists are right to say that cooperative relationships provide a
basis for egalitarian obligations. If this is true, suppose that
whenever cooperative relationships are present, equality is a concern
among parties to the relationship. If A and B share a cooperative
relation from which A benefits much more than B, assuming equal
contributions, this inequality is morally concerning.43 There is moral
reason to avoid it. But to what degree should equality between A
and B be promoted? The answer likely depends on the depth and
importance of their cooperative relationship. If A and B share a
limited business relationship or are members of the same club or
political advocacy group, securing the conditions of their equality
may not be very important at all.44 If A and B share a marriage, their
41 See, e.g., Harry Brighouse & Adam Swift, Equality, Priority, and
Positional Goods, 116 ETHICS 471 (2006).
42 This paragraph is informed by Scheffler, supra note 29.
43 See Garrett Cullity, Moral Free Riding, 24 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 3, 4 (1995).
" Charles Beitz considers a related example. See CHARLES BEITZ, POLITICAL
2012]
290 INTERCULTURAL HUMAN RIGHTS LA WREVIEW [Vol.7
equality might be extremely important from a moral point of view. It
would be very surprising indeed to find that these diverse
relationships triggered a concern for equality in the same way, or to
the same degree. The same is true for egalitarian theories that rest on
the importance of coercion.45 Many institutions may be coercive, but
to widely varying degrees.46 It would be surprising if a slight
coercive force in a contained aspect of one's life warranted the same
egalitarian principles as being subject to strongly coercive
institutions with pervasive effects.47
The implication of this complexity is that we cannot simply
redeploy our preferred domestic principles of equality to
international institutions. Instead, we must investigate first what
reasons make a given egalitarian principle suitable for a political
society. Then we can inquire whether these reasons apply to an
international context-for example, an international institution like
the WTO.48 It is possible that the relevant international principles
will be very different from their domestic analogs, but we might
hypothesize that it would be helpful to begin with well-known
principles. Domestic egalitarian principles may provide a good
starting point because theories of justice for states have been much
more thoroughly developed.
Here, we are concerned with two broad classes of egalitarian
principles: substantive and procedural. 49  Roughly, procedural
principles hold that some distributive outcome is justified if it is the
THEORY AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 165 (1979).
45 For examples of this, see Nagel, supra note 1; Freeman, supra note 2, and
Blake, supra note 2.
46 For discussion, see Matthias Risse, What to Say About the State, 32 Soc.
THEORY & PRAC. 671 (2006). Although a variety of institutions may be coercive
(i.e. physical force or violence or credible conditional threats of force or violence),
the extent of their coerciveness may vary considerably. Id.
47 For a longer discussion of this point, see Ryan W. Davis, Is an
International Egalitarianism Empirically Defensible? (Working Paper Presented at
Dartmouth University 2011).
48 See infra Part III.
49 For a recent statement of the distinction, see Teun J. Dekker, Choices,
Consequences, and Dessert, 52 INQUIRY 109, 119-20 (2009).
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outcome of a justified procedure. 50 Substantive theories reverse the
order of explanation, recommending a certain distributive outcome
and holding that procedures are justified insofar as they achieve it.51
This distinction might be understood in terms of direction of fit.
Substantive theories place priority on outcomes or results, and
understand a good procedure as one that tracks these outcomes.
Procedural theories prioritize procedures, and understand good
outcomes as those that result from a justified procedure. 52
If equality matters in some international institutions, the
question left to consider is how it matters. Equality might matter in a
broadly procedural way, or in a broadly substantive way (although
we should expect there will also be candidate principles that will
resist easy classification). These alternatives correspond to two
types of approaches to reforming international institutions. One
alternative focuses on the fact that wealthy states gain most of the
benefits of international cooperation facilitated by bodies like the
WTO.54 The associated proposal for reform requires that the
50 See Dekker, supra note 49, at 119. "Purely procedurally justified theories of
consequences determine the consequences of choices by applying some procedure
that is independently justified; as long as the consequences were set in the proper
fashion, they are just." Id.
" See id. "[S]ubstantively justified theories of consequences select
consequences by invoking some feature of choices in question. They associate this
feature with particular consequences that are deemed appropriate." Id.
52 For a discussion of the distinction between practice rules and rules of
thumb, see John Rawls, Two Concepts of Rules, 64 PHIL. REV. 3 (1955). See also
Tamar Schapiro, Three Conceptions of Action in Moral Theory, 35 NOOS 93
(2001). Rawls calls "pure procedural justice" the case in which there is "no
independent criterion for the right result: instead there is a correct or fair procedure
such that the outcome is likewise correct or fair, whatever it is, provided that the
procedure has been properly followed." RAWLS, supra note 10, at 86.
" Cf AMERICO BEVIGLIA ZAMPETTI, FAIRNESS IN THE WORLD ECONOMY: US
PERSPECTIVES ON INTERNATIONAL TRADE RELATIONS (2006). Zampetti makes the
related distinction between a fairness of benefit in a scheme of social cooperation,
and a fairness of a level playing field. Id.
54 See Joanne Gowa & Soo Yeon Kim, An Exclusive Country Club: The
Effects of the GATT on Trade, 1950-1994, 57 WORLD POL. 453 (2005); Meredith
Kolsky Lewis, WTO Winners and Losers: The Trade and Development
Disconnect, 39 GEO. J. INT'L L. 165 (2007); Gillian Moon, Trade and Equality: A
Relationship to Discover, 12 J. INT'L ECON. L. 617 (2009).
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economic benefits, resources, or opportunities be distributed among
cooperating states in some more equal way. Approaches of this type
display concern for substantive equality. They seek outcomes in
which cooperating parties are more equal in their share of some good
(resources, primary goods, cooperative benefits, etc.). The second
alternative focuses on the fact that wealthy states enjoy a set of
institutional advantages conferred by the formal or informal
procedures of the international institution.5 5 These advantages in
turn allow them to do relatively better, or secure a larger share of the
collective benefits of cooperation. This second approach proposes to
reform the institutions in a way that prevents differences in wealth or
power from deciding outcomes. It reflects a concern with
procedural equality.
It seems plausible to expect that the substantive and
procedural concerns for equality will be related. If more equal
procedures were adopted, we would expect greater substantive
equality in the distribution of goods. And if we began with a concern
for substantive equality, procedurally equal institutions might be an
efficient means of securing it. Nevertheless, there could also be
differences in what reforms these approaches would recommend.
We will consider the reasons for taking a substantive or procedural
approach in the next section. For now, the point we have tried to
establish is that regardless of the form of an egalitarian principle, we
should not complacently assume that principle can be exported from
a domestic to an international context.
III. Distributive Justice and International Institutions
This section begins the task of assembling materials to
construct a theory for applying the norm of equality to international
institutions. 6  We proceed by first sketching how a substantive
5' For a discussion of examples of reforming the WTO in a way that is
consistent with the demands of procedural justice, see infra Part IV.
56 We intend for this to be a theory that is generally applicable to international
institutions. We will, however, later turn to specifically discussing the WTO in
order to provide a specific illustration of our theory.
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principle of distributive justice might be implemented
internationally. To clarify, we use Rawls's difference principle as an
example, modifying this substantive distributive rule for application
to the WTO. However, we then observe that this principle-or any
other substantive egalitarian principle-confronts a series of
difficulties. These include a lack of popular support, a lack of
institutional structure necessary for implementation, and most
seriously, a paucity of moral facts for underwriting any such
principle as a constituent of justice among political societies.
Finally, we motivate the search for an acceptable procedural
alternative to any substantive egalitarian principle.
A. Substantive Principles of Distributive Justice
Philosophical defenders of "global justice" most often employ
what we are calling the substantive approach to treating equality as a
political concern. The project of achieving a more just world is
taken to be the project of securing a more equal distribution of
resources. Some cosmopolitans propose applying the difference
principle internationally.57 Others propose equality of opportunity,
or a "needs-based minimum floor.",58 These proposals share the idea
that securing global justice would involve promoting the substantive
equality of the world's less well-off. What we owe the global poor is
a greater or more equal share of resources. The content of these
principles does not apply, in the first instance, to the procedures that
help determine what the varying shares of resources or opportunities
will be. Rather, the principles apply directly to the outcomes that
would count as "more equal." Just institutions would be those that
help bring about the substantively just distribution.
57 See, e.g., MOELLENDORF, supra note 36. For other examples of substantive
principles being proposed, see Wenar, supra note 3; Pogge, supra note 3. For a
discussion of applying the difference principle to international institutions
including the WTO, see Frank J. Garcia, Global Justice and the Brettonwoods
Institutions, 10 J. INT'L ECON. L. 461 (2007).
58 SIMON CANEY, JUSTICE BEYOND BORDERS: A GLOBAL POLITICAL THEORY
(2005); Gillian Brock, The Difference Principle, Equality of Opportunity, and
Cosmopolitan Justice, 2 J. MORAL PHIL. 333 (2005).
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In considering international organizations like the WTO, which
egalitarian principle or principles are suitable candidates? To make
the issue more concrete, we will focus on one especially famous
principle of substantive equality-Rawls's difference principle.
59
Although we are not committed to the difference principle (or
something in its family of principles) being true, its broad familiarity
makes it a convenient starting place. Several proposals, beginning
with Beitz's seminal Political Theory and International Relations,
have considered a global difference principle analogous to Rawls's
principle of distribution for a closed society.6 ° Decades after it was
introduced into the idiom of political philosophy, the difference
principle remains a resilient contender for a plausible distributive
principle of fairness. Although the reasons why cannot be recounted
here, we believe that central to the difference principle's appeal is its
requirement that the basic structure be justified to each member of a
society. When inequality benefits the least advantaged person, it can
be justified to that person (otherwise the least advantaged person
would be even worse off). And if the least advantaged cannot
complain, no one can, so the system is fair.61 As Rawls understood
it, "the difference principle is essentially a principle of reciprocity.'"
62
Consider again relationships like those shared by members of
the WTO. If the difference principle is an appropriate principle of
distributive justice within a state like the United States, is it also
appropriate among members of the WTO? Although the WTO does
have norm-generative features and is therefore appropriately subject
to some egalitarian norms, the shared membership in the WTO
imposes significantly less serious risks than shared membership in a
state. True, the WTO burdens its members with the possibility of
manipulation and whatever attendant losses might follow, but it lacks
the coercive power of a state. 63 Further, the domain over which the
59 RAWLS, supra note 10, at 76.
60 BEITZ, supra note 44, at 125-77. See also MOELLENDORF, supra note 36.
61 See Jonathan Quong, Contractualism, Reciprocity, and Egalitarian Justice,
6 POL., PHIL., & EcoN. 175 (2007) (simplifying it to the point of being false, but
capturing the basic idea).
62 JOHN RAWLS, JUSTICE AS FAIRNESS: A RESTATEMENT 64 (2001).
63 See Richard Steinberg, In the Shadow of Law or Power? Consensus Based
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WTO could interfere is comparatively constrained because it
exclusively pertains to a set of issues relevant to international trade
practices. Given these limitations, it would be odd to find that the
same distributive principle required to provide justification to all
citizens was also required to provide justification to individuals
sharing much weaker institutional ties. The difference principle is
ordinarily concerned with the distribution of all social primary
goods, including income and wealth, powers and prerogatives of
offices and positions of responsibility, and the social bases of self-
64respect. For Rawls, these categories will encompass all social and
economic advantages a person could have. 65 In other words, the
reach of the difference principle is pervasive, which makes sense
given that its intended object of regulation-a basic structure-is
concomitantly pervasive. Like death and taxes, the basic structure's
influence can be counted upon. A basic structure has a "profound
and pervasive influence on the persons who live under its
institutions"--an influence that begins at the start of a person's life
and persists throughout it.
66
The difference principle assumes a baseline of complete
equality in all social and economic advantages, and sanctions any
inequalities as just from that point.67 That this assumption seems
right is a contingent matter. Intuitively, the magnitude of the impacts
involved justifies the baseline of equality. A few cases help to bring
out this intuition.
First, we consider a case we will call New World. Imagine a
Bargaining and Outcomes in the GATT/WTO, 56 INT'L ORG. 339 (2002).
64 For a discussion, see Philippe van Parijs, Difference Principles, in THE
CAMBRIDGE COMPANION TO RAWLS 200 (Samuel Freeman ed., 2003).
65 RAWLS, supra note 62, at 55.
66 id.
67 See Quong, supra note 61; Todd B. Adams, Rawls' Theory of Justice and
International Environmental Law: A Philosophical Perspective, 20 PAC.
MCGEORGE GLOBAL Bus. & DEV. L.J. 1 (2007); Arthur Ripstein, Private Order
and Public Justice: Kant and Rawls, 92 VA. L. REv. 1391 (2006); Kevin Kordana
& David Tabachnick, Rawls & Contract Law (The John M. Olin Program in Law
and Economics Working Paper, Paper 15 2005). On the application of the
Rawlsian approach to global justice, see also Anupan Chander, Globalization and
Distrust, 114 YALE L.J. 1193 (2005).
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group of explorers from several different states who embark on a
voyage to the new world. Upon arriving, they draw up a constitution
establishing their own sovereign state, independent of any others
from which they came. Happily, each of their respective political
societies of origin was governed according to all of the tenets of
justice as fairness, including the difference principle. At the time
they entered their ship, each explorer had a fair share of social and
economic advantages.
What egalitarian principle or principles should the explorers
adopt when they establish their own constitution? One possible
answer is to say that since they currently have a fair share of primary
goods, no distributive principle is needed, provided that they also
establish a fair system of exchange. Despite its libertarian ring, some
forms of egalitarianism might respond in this way as well.68
Rawlsians, however, may protest that such a system would fail to
justify the new state's coercion to its least advantaged member.
Given the responsibility of citizens for the state's coercion and the
expected impacts of that coercion, the explorers should set up a
system that includes the difference principle.
Next, consider a modified case, which we will call Voyage.
A group of explorers sets out from their respective Realistic
Rawlsian Utopias for a long journey. They do not establish their
own society, but they do hope to cooperate to acquire resources and
wealth along the way. Their economic interaction is limited to this
voyage alone, but over the course of their trip, they acquire various
assets through trade and discovery.
What egalitarian principle, if any, should the explorers in
Voyage adopt? Here, it seems inappropriate to apply the difference
principle just as it was applied in New World because the interaction
between the explorers in Voyage is more limited in its effects on their
life chances. If the voyagers did not cooperate at all, fairness would
not-ex hypothesi-require any particular distribution of goods
among them (since they are all from different societies with, let us
suppose, no interaction). As it is, their cooperation is limited in
68 Cf Matthew Seligman, Luck, Leverage, and Equality: A Bargaining
ProblemforLuckEgalitarians, 35 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 266 (2007).
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multiple ways: the duration of their cooperative project, the aspect of
their lives in which they are engaging in cooperation, and the impact
of their cooperative project. It would therefore seem odd if such
limited cooperation triggered exactly the same distributive demands
among them as the cooperation of members of the same political
community.
69
However, the explorers might still adopt some weaker principle
of fairness. They might, for example, adopt a related egalitarian
principle limited to the goods produced by their cooperative venture.
Such a principle might assume that each member of the voyage
should have an equal share of the benefits their voyage brought
about. The thought behind this revision is to limit the distribuendum
of an egalitarian principle to those goods naturally implicated by the
type of relationship the principle regulates. Call this domain
restricted egalitarianism.70 We will stipulate that according to
domain restricted egalitarianism, the domain of goods an egalitarian
69 Beitz suggests a threshold above which the difference principle would apply
as a way of solving the problem of variable levels of cooperation. BEITZ, supra
note 44, at 165-66. On his view, the contemporary world economy is more like the
case of a domestic basic structure in that both are importantly nonvoluntary. Id.
This point is extended to the WTO by both Cohen & Sabel and Maffettone,
suggesting that membership is importantly nonvoluntary. See Cohen & Sabel,
supra note 1; Maffettone, supra note 36. Although we do not investigate this
particular claim much here, we are not persuaded. It is true that actors did not
consent to the particular schedule of institutional options that they enjoy, but
neither do trading parties to any voluntary transaction get to choose what their
options will be. One might think that membership is nonvoluntary in that non-
membership is an unacceptable alternative. But this seems like a confusion about
voluntariness. If someone has only one job offer, turning it down may be an
unacceptable alternative. But certainly my choice to take the job is still voluntary.
And besides, it would be very surprising to learn that membership in the WTO
were somehow so vital that a state would be in an unacceptably bad state by
turning it down. Far from being vital, there is still reasonable disagreement on the
empirical question about whether such institutions make any causal difference at
all. The claim that membership in the WTO is nonvoluntary may thus potentially
be overwrought.
70 Although "domain restricted egalitarianism" is our own term, this
speculation about how intermediate egalitarian principles might be found finds a
forerunner in A.J. Julius's sliding maximum scale. See Julius, supra note 1, at 191
n.14.
2972012]
298 INTERCULTURAL HUMAN RIGHTS LA W REVIEW [Vol. 7
principle regulates should be informed by the types of goods whose
distribution would not exist without the regulated norm-generative
relationship.
As suggested in Part II-C, there is a problem with the exporting
strategy of lifting the distributive principle and applying it to an
international environment. The problem is that the reasons in virtue
of which equality is a political concern may be different, and this
difference creates a layer of complexity that likely renders the
exporting strategy inappropriate. Domain restricted egalitarianism
offers one path for managing the resultant complexity. It holds that
there should be some connection between the resources or goods
whose distribution an institution affects, and the particular subset of
goods that the egalitarian principle should manage. 7 1 To make this a
little clearer, suppose again that one's preferred egalitarian principle
is the difference principle, and the question is how the difference
principle might be lifted from the ordinary national context and
applied to the WTO. This might recommend a domain restricted
difference principle, which might say something like: any inequality
in the distribution of economic resources created by shared
membership in the WTO, and in the positions of power within the
WTO, should be arranged to benefit the least well-off person in a
WTO member state.
This principle is motivated by a revision in the exporting
strategy considered at the beginning of this section. 72 It exports the
difference principle from its original application to domestic political
society, but also modifies it in a way that makes it more compatible
with reasons supporting equality as a political concern within the
WTO. Because its demands are not out of touch with the level of
cooperation within the WTO, it is more plausible than exporting the
difference principle in an unrevised form.
71 In this way domain restricted egalitarianism is comparable to Wenar, supra
note 3.
72 Applying an egalitarian principle of justice to the WTO is supported by
interpretations of WTO law as based in "justice as equality." See Chios Charmody,
A Theory of WTO Law, 11 J. INT'L ECON. L. 527 (2008).
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B. The Shortcomings of Substantive Principles
Nevertheless, we believe that a revised distributive principle
of this form still faces several troubling objections. We will mention
three. First and most obviously, we might anticipate that such a
principle would confront a number of hurdles to implementation.
Many policy elites-not to mention public opinion more generally-
are swayed by the view that organizations like the WTO are to
promote trade, rather than to assist in the development of other
countries. Given this aim, they will argue that the United States
should try to extract as large a share of the goods of trade as it can,
and that implementing an egalitarian distributive principle would
undermine the reasons for American involvement in the WTO in the
first place. Of course, public opposition to a distributive principle
does not imply that it is not morally required, and so this challenge
alone might not be worth considering seriously. A more difficult
implementation problem is that there is no institutional structure in
organizations like the WTO to manage such redistribution.
Redistributing the goods of trade presupposes that there is some way
of identifying what those goods are. This is a nontrivial task.
Though social scientists largely agree that the WTO has produced
benefits, and that these benefits are skewed in favor of its richest and
most powerful members, 73 it is not clear exactly what the value of
the benefits is. This is a problem not only for implementation, but
for the principle itself, which assumes that some set of resources are
brought into existence by the shared membership in the institution.
And further, identifying the extent to which these benefits are
distributed inequitably will likely be fraught with controversy.
The political philosopher is free to dismiss these concerns as
someone else's problem-as issues to be resolved by social scientists
or institutional designers. It is true that the impracticability of a
theory of justice does not independently weigh against its
acceptance. 74  Still, these difficulties for substantive egalitarian
73 See infra text accompanying notes 83-86.
74 See DAVID ESTLUND, DEMOCRACY'S AUTHORITY: A PHILOSOPHICAL
FRAMEWORK 258-75 (2007).
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reform may belie deeper problems for this approach. It may not
sound troubling-at least to philosophers-to learn that there is
serious dissent from their proposed moral reform. But what would
be troubling is if the dissent indicated or provided evidence against
the general moral importance of the values motivating reform. How
could this happen? Very generally, it could happen if the actual
importance of the values was connected to persons' attitudes toward
the values, such that dissenting attitudes would tend to undermine the
values' importance. Consider the value of equality. The value of
equality follows from the bad, or the disvalue, of inequality.
75
Inequality is bad because it results in social harms like domination,
servility, and stigmatization. According to Martin O'Neill, these
harms are connected to inequality by a "deep social fact." 76 In other
words, where inequality is present, we should expect to find that
people experience feelings of being dominated by those with more, a
loss of self-respect that attends servility, and to notice that persons
feel stigmatized or stifled by their relative differences.
Notice that each of these bads associated with inequality
depends on the attitudes of those in the society where inequality is
present. If inequality really is connected to these bads by a deep
social fact, we should expect inequality to be robustly associated
with these negative attitudes. Notice also that this is an empirical
claim to be resolved by social science rather than philosophical
speculation. 77 And it seems that there is considerable doubt about
whether the claim is true. For example, economists have found that
there are considerable differences in how Americans and Europeans
respond to inequality. While Americans oppose inequality in some
forms, they are less aware of inequality at the top of the income
distribution, and less concerned about reducing inequality at the
bottom of the income distribution. 78 Americans also differ from
some Western Europeans in their beliefs about the relationship
75 See Scanlon, supra note 8. See also O'Neill, supra note 8.
76 See O'Neill, supra note 8, at 131.
77 See infra Part IV.D.
78 Lars Osberg & Timothy Smeeding, "Fair" Inequality? Attitudes Toward
Pay Differentials: The United States in Comparative Perspective, 71 AM. SOC.
REv. 450 (2006).
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between fairness and wealth. Those living in social democracies like
Sweden are less likely to regard individuals as responsible for the
causes of wealth. Instead, they are more likely to attribute wealth to
personal connections, as opposed to skill or intelligence.7 9 The
stability of these attitudes is not surprising. In countries with
institutions that favor limited redistribution and low taxation,
individual effort will have greater importance relative to luck in
determining wealth. 80 Beliefs about the relationship between effort
and success will tend to become self-fulfilling. Likewise, countries
that believe luck, birth, and connections are responsible for wealth
will implement higher taxes and redistribution, and these beliefs will
tend to become self-fulfilling as well.81
C. Motivating the Procedural Alternative
Results such as these may raise skepticism about just how
"deep" the social fact connecting inequality with negative attitudes
really is. While there is a social fact connecting inequality to a range
of negative attitudes, this fact seems to depend on economic
institutions that reinforce the attitudes in question. It is, in this sense,
shallower than egalitarians like O'Neill might have hoped.
Interestingly, the deep social fact seems to connect fairness and
responsibility. Americans and Europeans share the basic idea that
there is a relationship between what people are responsible for and
what is fair. They just disagree about the responsibility facts, and by
extension about the fairness of inequality in wealth or resources. Of
course, there is a further question about whether these judgments are
reasonable. Ought we take them seriously from a moral point of
view? The egalitarian might want to resist granting importance to
the judgments of actual persons. But this is just another way of
79 Ann-Sofie Isaksson & Annika Lindskog, Preferences for Redistribution-A
Cross Country Study in Fairness (G6teborg U. Sch. of Bus. Econ. & L., Working
Paper No. 258, 2007).
80 Albereto Alesina & George-Marios Angeletos, Fairness and Redistribution,
95 AM. ECON. REv. 960 (2005).
81 Id. at 960.
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raising the question about what really makes inequality bad. If the
badness of inequality is in some social fact, there must presumably
be some way of empirically identifying that social fact. If empirical
judgments about equality are not an acceptable measure, then we are
owed some explanation of what is.
These differences create a challenge for the substantive
egalitarian approach. To see why, consider another version of the
voyage case, which we will call Voyage 2. A group of explorers set
out together to cooperate and gain wealth. Their cooperation is
limited to the voyage. The explorers come from different political
societies. Each political society is free of the bads of inequality.
However, they achieve this in different ways. Some of the voyagers
come from societies in which income inequality is perceived as
connected to features of life for which individuals are not
responsible. In these societies, inequality is judged to be unfair, and
inequality in fact does cause feelings of servility, domination,
stigmatization, and so on. These societies have adopted strong
egalitarian principles of redistribution. Other voyagers come from
societies in which inequality is not associated with unfairness, and is
not a sufficient cause of feelings of servility, domination, or
stigmatization. These societies are therefore free of the bads of
inequality, though they may not be free of inequality.
This is a complicated case, but it may well reflect a serious
moral complexity confronted by international institutions like the
WTO. Suppose the voyagers want to adopt a domain-restricted
egalitarian principle. How should they go about it? Voyagers from
societies in which inequality causes servility and domination will
prefer a strongly egalitarian substantive principle. Voyagers from
societies that regard differences in wealth as resulting from effort
will prefer to give each explorer greater latitude in retaining the
goods that she personally discovers. Accordingly, they will prefer a
more limited substantive principle of equality, if any at all.
The problem is not just that the explorers disagree about the
evaluative significance of equality. Rather, the problem is that the
evaluative facts are different for different explorers. Relative to the
explorers from egalitarian-minded societies, inequality is very bad,
and so equality is correspondingly valuable. But relative to the
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explorers from less egalitarian societies, inequality is not as bad. In
other words, because the importance of equality depends on non-
robust social facts, the value of equality will be agent relative. And
because the explorers come from societies in which the social facts
differ, the agent relative value of equality will be different for
different individual voyagers. 2 This disagreement makes choosing a
substantive egalitarian principle very difficult. It is not just that we
do not know how to choose, because the fact about which principle is
just is epistemically unavailable. The challenge is that there may not
be any such fact at all, because there may not be a single coherent set
of values to underwrite any such principle. In the next section, we
will argue that the procedural approach to equality does a better job
responding to the considerations that made equality a political
concern in the first place.
IV. The World Trade Organization and Institutional Equality
We have thus far tried to construct an argument that procedural
approaches to justice should provide an effective means of
implementing a moral concern for equality. We believe that this
theory can help illuminate how equality can best be promoted within
international institutions like the WTO. Established in 1995 as a
replacement to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT),
the WTO is an organization that has sought to promote economic
exchange by breaking down barriers to trade.83 Today, the WTO has
over 150 members and has achieved major successes in opening
markets and promoting liberalization. There has been growing
concern, however, that the benefits that the WTO has generated have
82 For a general defense of agent relative values, see Michael Smith, Neutral
and Relative Value after Moore, 113 ETHics 576 (2003).
83 See generally Christina Davis, Who Adjudicates? Enforcing Trade Rules in
the WTO 6-8 (May 11, 2011)(unpublished manuscript)(on file with author). See
also CHAD P. BOwN, SELF-ENFORCING TRADE: DEVELOPING COUNTRIES AND
WTO DISPUTE SETTLEMENT 45-62 (2009) (providing a history of dispute
settlement under the GATT and WTO).
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not been distributed equally.84  Instead, developing countries have
had difficulties using the dispute settlement process to assert their
formal rights and ensuring that they are treated fairly within the
WTO.8 5 As a result, we believe that the WTO presents an excellent
example of an international institution that could be reformed to
improve distributive justice.86 In this section we will first explain
why the procedural approach to equality is better suited to locating
an egalitarian principle to govern international institutions like the
WTO. We will then discuss how attempts at promoting formal
procedural equality alone will do little to ensure that developing
countries are able to promote their interests. Finally, we will outline
how attempts at advancing informal procedural justice through
helping developing countries improve their capacity to defend their
rights is the optimal way to ensure distributive justice within the
WTO.
A. Procedural Justice and the WTO
The shortcomings of substantive principles of distributive
justice are easily seen in the context of the WTO. Consider, in a very
general way, how the substantive and procedural approaches might
84 See, e.g., Chad P. Bown & Rachel McCulloch, Developing Countries,
Dispute Settlement, and the Advisory Centre on WTO Law, 19 J. INT'L TRADE &
ECON. DEV. 33, 34 (2010). "Yet many observers, and especially those representing
the interests of poor countries, judge that participation in the Uruguay Round and
in the WTO have so far yielded few benefits for [developing and least developed]
countries." Id. But see BOWN, supra note 83, at 22-44 (arguing that WTO has had
mixed results for developing countries); Arvind Subramanian & Shang-Jin Wei,
The WTO Promotes Trade, Strongly but Unevenly, 72 J. INT'L ECON. 151, 153-54
(2007) (arguing that part of the reason developing countries have gained less from
the WTO is that they have taken fewer steps to liberalize).
5 See, e.g., Bown & McCulloch, supra note 84.
86 For the view that finding ways to promote the importance of developing
countries within the WTO is important, see J.H. Jackson, Perceptions About the
WTO Trade Institutions, 1 WORLD TRADE REv. 101, 111 (2002). "This
participation of the developing countries in this system is, in the opinion of many,
absolutely vital to the long-term durability and effectiveness of the WTO dispute
settlement system, and, therefore, probably of the WTO itself." Id.
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be specifically presented as a solution to the prospect of being
harmed; for example, through the manipulation or coercion of more
powerful agents. The substantive approach guarantees members an
equitable share-at least roughly. 87 This helps solve the problem,
since we have been assuming that developing states in the WTO are
sometimes manipulated into taking inequitably small shares of the
goods of trade.88 If they were guaranteed an equal share, then the
harms associated with manipulation would be mitigated, or even
eliminated. Does it follow that the moral problem of manipulation
would be solved? It does not. The reason is that wronging does not
reduce to harming. To see why, notice that one person can wrong
another without causing any harm. For example, it is wrong to touch
another person in a way they do not consent to, even if the person is
unconscious, not harmed in any way, and never learns of the
incident. 89 People have moral rights to more than freedom from
harm.
So even if the substantive strategy removed the harms of
manipulation, it does not follow that it would render manipulation
morally innocuous. Members of the institution might plausibly care
about more than just getting a fair share of the goods provided by the
institution. They might also care about being treated as equal
members of the institution, or being recognized as contributing or
cooperating parties. Even if equality in resources was secured, it
would not be attended by this recognition if manipulation remained.
Manipulating a person is one way of disrespecting him or her, which
involves a failure to recognize that person's moral authority. For
example, if someone wrongs you by punching you in the face, what
he or she did is still wrong, even if they compensate you with money.
This remains true even if you judge the compensation to exceed the
harm of the punch, such that you judge yourself to be, on balance,
benefited by the exchange. It was still disrespectful to punch you,
87 See supra Part III (discussing equitable share). We are leaving open what
counts as equal and what the share should be of, but these issues were confronted
in the previous section. How they are settled will not matter for the current issue.
88 Cf Gowa & Kim, supra note 54.
89 This example is from Arthur Ripstein, Beyond the Harm Principle, 34 PHIL.
& PUB. AFF. 216 (2006).
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and this is still wrong.
Does the procedural approach face a symmetrical problem? If it
works, the procedural approach guarantees (let us suppose) that
members are protected from manipulation. It does not follow that
they will thereby secure a substantively equal share of the resources
produced by membership in the institution. Poorer members might
still lose out for other reasons. Perhaps this is still concerning, but it
is not necessarily morally concerning. Suppose someone goes into a
fair bargaining game and happens to lose out for reasons that he or
she is responsible for (say, he or she did not exercise their capacity to
compete in the game effectively, despite having the capacity). Here
it seems that the loss is bad for him or her, and so perhaps harmful.
It does not follow that he or she has been wronged, and indeed, there
need not be anything morally concerning about his or her loss at all.
For example, if your neighbor cuts down a tree in her yard, thus
exposing your house to the afternoon sun, you are made worse off,
but not in a way that gives you grounds for moral complaint. There
is no entitlement that others avoid changing the circumstances of our
actions in ways that are adverse to us.
90
On balance, the procedural approach is starting to look like a
better alternative to the substantive approach. This finding echoes a
result about domestic political equality among citizens. In Political
Equality, Charles Beitz argues that a theory of political equality faces
the task of "identifying the features that institutions for political
participation should possess if they can truly be said to treat citizens
as equals." 91  Beitz identifies three such features: recognition,
equitable treatment, and deliberative responsibility.92 Recognition
90 At least, this is not sufficient for someone to have an entitlement. This
point and the example preceding it are similar to a point of Ripstein's. See
ARTHUR RfPsTEIN, FORCE AND FREEDOM: KANT'S LEGAL AND POLITICAL
PHILOSOPHY (2009).
91 BEITZ, supra note 8, at 98. Beitz's own claim is finely grained in ways to
which our broad distinction is insensitive. For example, Beitz allows that a theory
of political equality should not ignore results-oriented considerations altogether.
Id. Rather, theories that treat procedural fairness as depending on results bring in
results "in the wrong way." Id. at 46.
92 Id. at 100.
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refers to the public status of roles occupied by citizens. 93 If some
citizens are officially accorded a lower or inferior status, they are not
then being recognized as equal. Equitable treatment requires that
citizens' interests not be unfairly jeopardized by the political
process.94 Deliberative responsibility ensures that political decisions
are sensitive to informed, diverse public discussion or
consideration.
95
In the remainder of this section, we propose to follow an
analogous strategy for international institutions, focusing on the
WTO. What procedures would protect members of the WTO against
wrongful manipulation? As in the domestic case, it will help to
identify desiderata for a set of procedures. We have suggested that it
will not suffice to locate these desiderata in the substantive ends that
the procedures aim at or seek to produce. Instead, they will be
desiderata of the procedures themselves, rather than the results of the
procedures. The analogy with the domestic political case may also
extend beyond the search for procedural values. The values
themselves may also be similar. 96 Consider the feature of procedures
that Beitz labels "recognition." 97 A problem with manipulation in
the WTO is that it seems to deny the good of recognition, because it
relegates those subject to manipulation, or the risk of manipulation,
93 BEITZ, supra note 8, at 100
94 Id.
" Jd., at 110-14.
96 See James Thuo Gathii, International Justice and the Trading Regime, 19
EMORY INT'L L. REv. 1407 (2005). Gathii explains that fairness has been an
important aim of the WTO from its inception:
Since the establishment of the WTO in 1995, the objective of
ensuring a fairer, more open, and transparent international
trading framework has been expressly recognized in the
founding texts of the WTO. In fact, several WTO agreements
also expressly mention fairness as a criterion for the application
of WTO rules by national authorities and adjudicatory bodies.
For example, the Agreement on Agriculture has as an objective a
'fair and market oriented agricultural trading system.' Article
2.4 of the Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of GATT
provides that 'a fair comparison shall be made between the
export price and normal value.' Id. at 1423.
97 BEITZ, supra note 8, at 1 10.
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to a lower status. This worry squares with a central concern about
the WTO in the empirical literature: the inability of developing
countries to effectively use the WTO's Dispute Settlement
Procedures." Poor countries participate much less frequently in
making claims against other members of the WTO. Rich states, led
by the United States and the European Union, have initiated a
sizeable majority of complaints.99 Further, these differences appear
to be distributionally significant. Once a country has won a case
through the WTO's Dispute Settlement Procedures, other trade
partners become more cautious toward that country. 00 So there are
additional positive returns to being an active complainant.' This
helps make sense of why most of the goods of trade liberalization
through the WTO have been accumulated by the rich.
B. The Failure of Formal Proceduralism
There are two types of procedural strategies for responding to
this problem. One approach is to reform the formal Dispute
Settlement Process (DSP) in ways that would recognize the public
status of each member as equal. A second approach would be to
leave the formal procedures in place, but look for ways barriers to
access for poor countries might be removed. In this way, the goods
of recognition could be provided without legal change. Call this the
difference between formal and informal proceduralist approaches.
0 2
98 See, e.g., James Smith, Inequality in International Trade? Developing
Countries and Institutional Change in WTO Dispute Settlement, 11 REv. INT'L
POL. ECON. 542 (2004); Marc Busch & Eric Reinhardt, Developing Countries and
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade/World Trade Organization Dispute
Settlement, 37 J. WORLD TRADE 719 (2003).
99 See Christina Davis & Sarah Blodgett Bermeo, Who Files? Developing
County Participation in GATT/WTO Adjudication, 71 J. POL. 1033 (2009). Davis
and Bermeo report that rich states have filed 239 of 376 complaints. Id. at 1033.
100 Id. at 1034.
101 Cf id
102 This is similar to a distinction offered in Chad P. Bown & Bernard M.
Hoekman, WTO Dispute Settlement and the Missing Developing Country Cases:
Engaging the Private Sector, 8 J. INT'L ECON. L. 861, 864 (2005).
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The formal approach has considerable appeal. Public
recognition of one's standing or status is sometimes associated with
official or legal recognition. And one might further suppose that
securing equal formal recognition would be instrumentally valuable
to preventing manipulative wrongdoing. This thought is natural in
the setting of domestic justice, where equality before the law is
important to being fairly treated within the legal system. But
supposing that formal status is what matters assumes that the
important aspect of the WTO's Dispute Settlement Understanding is
its legal force, and this assumption may be false. °3 The WTO
renders legally binding decisions, but these decisions also create
reputational concerns. Either mechanism could be important in
affecting how countries trade. As an empirical matter, there is
evidence that the reputation effect is more important than legal
status. 10 4 Dispute settlement mechanisms that involve only review
by third parties, but lack binding legal decisions or standing
tribunals, do just as well at promoting trade. 10 5  In this way, the
domestic analogy connecting legal status with recognition breaks
down. Decisions under the WTO's Dispute Settlement
Understanding do not impinge on member states in the way that the
decisions of a domestic court constrain citizens. 1° 6  Rather, they
create reputational costs for noncompliance.107 This underscores an
insight of statists like Nagel: there is something distinctly different
about the international context.10 8 Decisions made within it are made
103 See, e.g., Chad P. Bown, Participation in WTO Dispute Settlement:
Complaints, Interest Parties, and Free Riders, 19 WORLD BANK ECON. REv. 287,
288 (2005). "[A]lithough all WTO members have equal access to the system in
principle, use of the dispute settlement provisions may reflect an institutional
bias-that is, that the poor or powerless members do not participate because of the
incentives generated by WTO rules and procedures." Id.
104 See Daniel Y. Kono, Making Anarchy Work: International Legal
Institutions and Trade Cooperation, 69 J. POL. 746 (2007).
105 See id.
106 Id. at 757.
107 For a more detailed discussion on the reputational impacts of
noncompliance in international institutions, see Rachel Brewster, Unpacking the
State's Reputation, 50 HARV. INT'L L.J. 231 (2009).
108 See Nagel, supra note 1.
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under conditions of anarchy rather than hierarchy, so legal status
does not carry the same normative force. How this translates into a
normative account of recognition is a further issue, but there is some
reason for skepticism that legal status will have the same
recognitional import in the WTO that it has domestically.
In fact, there may be an even stronger case against the formal
route. An early hope for the WTO had been that formal legal
procedures would "put an end to the law of the jungle, where might
is right."1 °9 On this view, the predicted beneficiaries of legalization
are developing countries. With greater legal protections, weak states
would have the means to prevent themselves from being manipulated
by stronger states. 110 However, legalization has had both benefits
and costs, and these have not followed expectations. Legalization
decreases uncertainty and increases the ability of different countries
to coordinate their expectations about outcomes, yielding benefits in
trade. These benefits are produced through specifying the
substantive rules of trade with procedural rules."' For example, a
substantive rule might forbid a certain action (e.g., the prohibition
against the use of quotas), and a procedural rule might guide how to
follow the substantive rule (e.g., filing legal complaints when
warranted by violations of the substantive rule). 1 2  On the other
hand, legalization yields increasingly complex procedural rules,
which are costly for states to follow." 3 In consequence, only states
109 Don Moon, Equality and Inequality in the WTO Dispute Settlement (DS)
System: Analysis of the GATT/WTO Dispute Data, 32 INT'L INTERACTIONS 201,
202 (2006) (quoting Peter Sutherland, former GATT Director General).
1"0 The WTO's first Director General, Renato Ruggiero has argued that "by
reducing the scope for unilateral actions, [the WTO] is an important guarantee of
fair trade for less powerful countries." Henrick Horn et al., Is the Use of the WTO
Dispute Settlement System Biased?, in THE WTO AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE
LAw/DIsPUTE SETTLEMENT 454 (Petros C. Mavroidis & Alan 0. Sykes eds., 2005).
111 This explanation is taken from Moonhawk Kim, Costly Procedures:
Divergent Effects of Legalization in the GATT/WTO Dispute Settlement
Procedures, 52 INT'L STUD. Q. 657 (2008).
112 Id. at 661.
113 See Timothy Stostad, Trappings of Legality: Judicialization of Dispute
Settlement in the WTO, and its Impact on Developing Countries, 39 CORNELL
INT'L L.J. 811, 814 (2006) (arguing that the WTO has become less accessible to
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with high capacity can use complicated legal-procedural rules for
their interests.
At worst, the resulting system could have the opposite of its
intended effect. Rather than giving the weak a tool against the rich,
legalization might just put another arrow into the quiver of already
powerful states. Poor countries often lack the technical legal
expertise and financial resources to work within the WTO's legal
system, and they may also fear reprisal by the powerful states against
which they would file claims.'1 4 Developing countries are actually
less likely to file complaints under the WTO than they were under
the GATT, but the percentage of cases targeting developing countries
has risen significantly. 115 Moreover, "the most pointed criticisms of
the new WTO system have come from its presumed beneficiaries."
' 6
The developing world's weaknesses betray the difficulty of
achieving equality through further legalization. Asymmetries in
ability to make use of the formal rules has led legal scholars to
conclude that the key to reform is not changing the legal system, but
equipping developing countries to operate within it. 117  This
recommends the informal proceduralist approach. Before detailing
potential solutions, it will be helpful to clarify the extent of the
problem. Developing countries face multiple layers of obstacles to
effective participation within the WTO.118 First, exporting industries
within developing countries often have difficulty organizing to
poor members because of "the vastly increased complexity of the substantive law,
coupled with the more formal, quasi-judicial litigation process, has imposed
enormous costs on would-be users of the system, both in the pre-litigation stage
(when a country first identifies the existence of a disputable trade measure) and
during the litigation itself (when substantial legal expertise is needed to 'try' a
case)").
114 Roderick Abbott, Are Developing Countries Deterredfrom Using the WTO
Dispute Settlement System? 1 (ECIPE Working Paper No. 01, 2007).
115 Gregory Shaffer, How to Make the WTO Dispute Settlement System Work
for Developing Countries: Some Proactive Developing Country Strategies, 14
(ICTSD Resource Paper No. 5, 2003).
116 Smith, supra note 98, at 543.
117 Cf Schaffer, supra note 115, at 26.
118 These reasons are provided in Bown & Hoekman, supra note 102, at 870-
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pressure their governments to take a case to the WTO. 119 Second,
even if they do succeed at organizing, their countries often lack
public sectors that facilitate government responsiveness. 02 Third,
developing countries lack the necessary private sector competence-
for example, private law firms to pursue cases. Combined with
expenses of up to $1 million for bringing a case to the WTO, it is
easy to see why developing countries are largely blocked from
participation. 
121
C. The Potential of Informal Proceduralism
Can an informal proceduralist approach remove these
obstacles? 122 In other words, it is worth considering whether there
are reforms that could be taken to help developing countries gain the
capacity to participate fully within the WTO. Encouragingly, some
developing countries participate much more effectively within the
WTO than others. Even though Botswana exports a higher
percentage of its GDP than Costa Rica, the latter has become a fairly
active participant while the former has never filed a case. 12  Costa
Rica's path to participation is informative. Costa Rica filed against
the United States regarding US restrictions on trade in the clothing
industry. 124 With an excellent team of US-trained lawyers, the Costa
Rican government overcame considerable opposition from both the
United States and elements in its own government concerned about
damaging relations with America. 125 Annabel Gonzales, a member
"9 Cf Megumi Naoi, Shopping for Protection: The Politics of Choosing
Trade Instruments in a Partially Legalized World, 53 INTL'L STUD. Q. 421 (2009).
120 See Davis & Bermeo, supra note 99, at 1039.
121 Id.
122 As a reminder, we have defined informal proceduralist approaches as those
that leave formal procedures in place, but attempt to remove barriers to access for
poor countries. See supra text accompanying note 102.
123 Davis & Bemeo, supra note 99, at 1038.
124 See Request for Consultation by Costa Rica, United States-Restrictions
on Imports of Cotton and Man-Made Fibre Underwear, WT/DS24/1 (Jan. 15,
1996).
125 For a detailed case study, see John Breckenridge, Costa Rica's Challenge
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of the Costa Rican team, noted that the government decided to
proceed after determining that the case was straight forward and
clearly a winner for Costa Rica. 126  Rather than damaging its
relationship, Costa Rica also enjoyed an increase in respect for its
status with the United States and other WTO members. 27 The case
also prepared Costa Rica for future participation. Gonzales
subsequently reported, "Once we had learned to use the system we
felt we might as well go ahead and use it.
128
Through participating, Costa Rica gained something like
recognition within the WTO. The Costa Rican case is illustrative of
how participation can be efficacious in facilitating future
participation, and this can help reduce the vulnerability to
manipulation.1 29  Costa Rica's Washington embassy opposed
pursuing the case, dismissing Costa Rica's own lawyers as driven by
a naively "romantic" and "theoretical" vision.1 30 The case's success
showed that Costa Rica did not have to adopt a position of servility
or second class status, but instead could assert its equal standing.
Davis and Bermeo find that Costa Rica's experience is representative
of the benefits of experience. 131 Participating in a dispute provides a
"pathway to experience" and future participation as a claimant.,32
Such experience may be gained either as a claimant, as in the Costa
Rican case, or as a defendant. Noticing this, Davis and Bermeo point
out that one way to advance the participatory ability of poor
countries would be to file more claims against them! 133 They hasten
to US Restrictions on the Import of Underwear, in MANAGING THE CHALLENGES
OF WTO PARTICIPATION: 45 CASE STUDIES 178 (Peter Gallagher et al. eds., 2005).
126 Breckenridge, supra note 125, at 187.
127 Id. at 186.
128 Davis & Bermeo, supra note 99, at 1037.
129 Cf Kyle Bagwell et al., Auctioning Countermeasures in the WTO, 73 J.
INT'L ECON. 309, 310 (2007). "One prominent problem is the practical difficulty
faced by small and developing countries in finding the capacity to retaliate
effectively against trading partners that are in violation of their WTO
commitments." Id.
130 Breckenridge, supra note 125, at 184.
131 Davis & Bermeo, supra note 99, at 1038.
132 Id.
133 Id. at 1048.
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to add that they do not advocate achieving equality that way, but the
possibility recalls an important point. In the dramatic conclusion of
The Problem of Global Justice, Nagel expressed concern that the
only way toward justice might be through injustice. 34 Without
taking active steps to assist developing countries in overcoming entry
barriers to participation, Nagel's pessimistic prophecy might well be
made true. The question, then, is whether there are informal
procedural reforms that could help overcome these barriers without a
detour through injustice.
V Egalitarian Proposals to Reform the WTO
The WTO is an institution that has had considerable success
in reducing trade barriers, and by doing so, it has increased the
economic opportunities of people around the globe. As we have
argued, however, the benefits from the liberalization that the WTO
has produced have not been equally distributed.135  Instead,
developing states have had difficulty ensuring that their rights to
access foreign markets are fully respected. As we have argued, the
just way to rebalance this inequality is for the WTO to undertake
procedural reforms that help developing states to protect their
interests. Fortunately, lawyers and social scientists have already
begun to explore avenues that might arrive at justice without detours
through injustice in exactly this way. In this part we will outline
several proposals that have been put forward that fit this description.
We recognize, of course, that there are limits to the political viability
of these proposals.' 36  Our objective is not to outline the most
feasible way to reform the WTO, but instead to argue for proposals
13' Nagel, supra note 1, at 145-47.
135 See BOWN, supra note 83, at 238. "The consensus among many analysts of
and participants in the current international trading system appears to be that there
are two distinct World Trade Organizations-one for rich economies and one for
poor economies." Id. See also Horn et al., supra note 110, at 454 (noting that there
has been a "debate about whether the DS system is biased against smaller and
poorer countries").
136 For an expression of similar concerns, see Steinberg, supra note 63. See
also Shaffer, supra note 115, at 41.
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that would promote institutional equality within the WTO in a way
that is consistent with the distributive theory of justice that we have
advanced.
In this part we will specifically discuss three proposals to
reform the WTO that satisfy our egalitarian proposal's demands.
First, we will discuss the value of Advisory Centers that help
developing states to increase their capacity and enforce their legal
rights. We argue that although the existing Advisory Centre on
WTO Law does important work to help developing states, efforts
should be taken to expand its capacity as well as establish additional
centers to provide legal advice to help poor states defend their rights.
Second, we consider the benefits of expanding the remedies available
through the WTO dispute-resolution system to include payment of
damages. We believe that this proposal would improve the
bargaining position and resources of developing states within the
WTO. Finally, we explain the virtue of proposals that would allow
states whose rights have been violated to auction their right to take
countermeasures. This reform would both create a financial gain for
developing countries and increase the incentive for developed states
to not violate their WTO obligations. These three proposals share in
common the aim of enabling poor countries to use the legal system
provided by the WTO more effectively, and thus instantiate one way
an instrumentalist egalitarianism could be developed that is
consistent with the demands of justice.
A. Improving and Expanding Advisory Centers
One step that has been taken to assist poor countries in asserting
their rights in the WTO is the creation of the Advisory Centre on
WTO Law (ACWL).137 Given the high costs and expertise required
to utilize the WTO dispute resolution settlement system, there was
137 See Kenneth Ruwan Schunken, The Advisory Centre on WTO Law: A
Success Story, But for Whom?, 7 L. & PRAC. INT'L COURTS & TRIBUNALS 59, 63
(2008) (stating that "[t]he Advisory Center on WTO Law... was founded in order
to contribute to the greater participation of developing and least developed
countries and to enhance the credibility of the WTO dispute settlement system").
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concern that developing countries would not be able to enforce their
rights to access the markets of more powerful states. 138 In an effort
to address these concerns, an agreement to establish the ACWL as a
separate entity from the WTO was signed on December 1, 1999 by
twenty-nine countries, and went into effect on July 15, 2001.139 The
ACWL is primarily funded by "High-Income" members of the WTO,
and provides general legal advice and support to complainants,
respondents, and third parties in WTO disputes. 140  These services
are available to two groups of countries. 141  The first group of
countries is members of the Centre. Any developing country that
joins the WTO is entitled to become a member of the ACWL, but to
do so must make a contribution to the Centre's endowment. There
are currently thirty countries that are members of the Centre. 142 The
second group of countries that are able to use the services of the
ACWL is Least Developed Countries (LDCs) that are members of
the WTO. These countries are automatically entitled to access the
services of the ACWL without formally becoming a member.
Currently, there are forty-three LDCs that are members of the WTO
138 See Bown & McCulloch, supra note 84, at 35 (noting that "several
[developing countries] have proposed that the WTO should bear all costs
associated with the efforts of developing countries to enforce their market access
rights"). See also Kim Van der Borght, The Advisory Center on WTO Law:
Advancing Fairness and Equality, 2 J. INT'L ECON. LAW 723, 723 (1999) (arguing
for the need to support developing states to litigate in the WTO because "[t]hey
often do not possess the specialist legal expertise and/or experience in international
trade law needed to assess whether their legitimate rights are being infringed, thus
forgoing any chance of enforcement of these rights").
139 Gregory Shaffer, The Challenges of WTO Law: Strategies for Developing
Country Adaptation, 5 WORLD TRADE REv. 177, 187 (2006). See also Schunken,
supra note 137, at 64 (arguing that "[t]he establishment of the [ACWL] was one of
the few successes accomplished during the WTO Ministerial Meeting in Seattle in
1999").
140 See Chad P. Bown & Bernard M. Hoekman, WTO Dispute Settlement and
the Missing Developing Country Cases: Engaging the Private Sector, 8 J. INT'L
EcON. L. 861, 874 (2005). See also ACWL Mission, available at
http://www.acwl.ch/e/about/aboutus.html (last accessed March 3, 2011).
141 See The Advisory Centre on WTO Law Quick Guide, available at
http://www.acwl.ch/e/documents/Quick%20guide%202011 %20for/20website.pdf
(last accessed March 3, 2011).
142 id.
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and fall into this category.143 Taken together, roughly half of the
WTO's 153 members are entitled to access the services of the
ACWL.144
Since its founding in 2001, the ACWL has assisted its members
and LDCs to participate in a range of litigation activities within the
WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU). 145 Between 2001
and 2008, the ACWL helped countries participate in twenty-three of
the 144 disputes initiated. 146 Of these twenty-three cases, in nineteen
the Centre assisted its clients to bring a dispute as a claimant. 147
These suits included cases against the United States and European
Community, as well as suits by one developing state against
another. 148  Furthermore, there is evidence to suggest that the
establishment of the ACWL helped to increase the participation of
developing states in the dispute-settlement process. 149  Since the
establishment of the Centre, a larger share of WTO disputes have
been initiated by developing countries.1 50  It is worth noting,
however, that all but one of the ACWL's clients previously had
experience with the DSU.' 5 ' That said, although the ACWL may
have had limited success helping new states start to participate in the
dispute-settlement process, the Centre has helped its clients initiate
143 See The Advisory Centre on WTO Law Quick Guide, supra note 142.
144 id.
145 See Bernard M. Hoekman & Petros C. Mavroidis, The WTO Dispute
Settlement, Transparency, and Surveillance, 23 WORLD ECON. 527, 535 (2000)
(comparing the ACWL to a public defender in domestic settings that helps ensure
that all citizens can have legal assistance).
146 Bown & McCulloch, supra note 84, at 48.
147 id.
148 Id. at 50 (noting that between 2001 and 2008 the ACWL help clients file
complaints against the United States three times, the European Community six
times, and against developing countries nine times).
149 See BOWN, supra note 83, at 160-61. "Although [this study] found almost
no evidence that the ACWL is introducing completely new countries without prior
DSU experience to WTO self-enforcement, the evidence does suggest that the
ACWL is empowering many developing countries without prior, albeit sometimes
minimal, DSU experience to do more." Id.
150 Bown & McCulloch, supra note 84, at 50.
1 Id. at 51.
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solo-complaints when they had only previously served as third
parties, and also helped its clients take litigation further in the dispute
process than those states had previously gone. 1
52
Despite the resources that the ACWL provides, there are still a
number of significant limitations on the Centre's ability to help
developing countries enforce their rights to access the markets of
powerful members of the WTO.' 53 First, there are valid concerns
that the funding structure of the ACWL creates conflicts of
interest. 154 The Center is dependent on rich states for contributions,
and these states have incentives to not provide all the resources
necessary for developing states to litigate all of their valid claims
aggressively. Even if rich countries provide funding, it makes
support dependent on the will of the powerful, and so undermines the
equal standing of developing member states.' 55 As a result of these
concerns, there have been suggestions for either seeking funding
from private organizations, 56 or extending an annual membership
fee, 157 to help ensure the Centre is on stable financial footing.
Second, not all states that could stand to benefit from the resources
of the ACWL can access them. 158 Currently the ACWL is based in
Geneva, and although the Centre does try to perform outreach, many
states simply do not have representatives near the ACWL. To
remedy these problems, there have been proposals to create
additional legal service offices in Washington and Brussels, where
152 Bown & McCulloch, supra note 84, at 53.
153 It is worth noting that the current ACWL also has very limited resources.
For example, there are less than ten lawyers that work at the center. See BOWN,
supra note 83, at 138.
154 See Bown & Hoekman, supra note 140, at 875. "For political reasons, a
rich country government may be hesitant to sufficiently fund a legal services centre
that ultimately provides litigation assistance directly challenging its own actions."
Id.
155 It could be argued that this arrangement raises worries of domination. See,
e.g., PHILLIP PETTrIT, REPUBLICANISM: A THEORY OF FREEDOM AND GOVERNMENT
(1997).
156 Id.
157 See Schunken, supra note 137, at 73-74.
158 See Bown & Hoekman, supra note 140, at 875. "[T]he ACWL can advise
clients in need of assistance only once they arrive and request it." Id.
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firms with technical expertise could offer pro bono services to
developing world clients,' 59 and to put more resources toward
developing a field training program to help officials in developing
countries to gain the skills necessary to bring their own cases
effectively. 160  Finally, currently the ACWL only advises
governments, which are often unaware of the claims that they could
potentially litigate in the WTO. 16 1 Efforts could thus be taken to
extend the ACWL mandate to provide legal advice so that exporters
in developing countries or NGOs could access the Centre's resources
and expertise to identify possible cases that domestic governments
could take to the WTO.162
B. Providing Financial Remedies
Another area where the WTO could be reformed to help protect
the rights of developing states would be to alter the remedies that are
available after a successful claim is brought through the dispute-
settlement process.' 63 In the current system, there are three basic
remedies available in the WTO. 164 The primary remedy if a state is
found to be in violation of its WTO obligations is that the breaching
159 See Bown & Hoekman, supra note 140, at 876-79. See also Shaffer, supra
note 139, at 33 (arguing that by "harnessing domestic political pressure and legal
expertise within the United States and Europe, developing countries can curtail, at
least somewhat, great power coercion").
160 See Schunken, supra note 137, at 74-75.
161 Id. at 75-76.
162 id.
163 See generally Robert Hudec, Broadening the Scope of Remedies in WTO
Dispute Settlement, in IMPROVING WTO DISPUTE SETTLEMENT PROCEDURES:
ISSUES AND LESSONS FROM THE PRACTICE OF OTHER INTERNATIONAL COURTS AND
TRIBUNALS 345 (Friedi Weiss ed., 2000).
164 See Joel P. Trachtman, The WTO Cathedral, 43 STAN. J. INT'L L. 127, 131
(2007). "The basic remedies in WTO law are, in order, cessation, consensual
compensation, and non-consensual suspension of concessions or other
obligations." Id. See also Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the
Settlement of Disputes, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the
World Trade Organization, Annex 2, 1869 U.N.T.S. 401, art. 3(7) [hereinafter
DSU].
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state is ordered to cease the non-conforming practice.1 65  If the
offending state is unwilling to bring its practices into compliance
with WTO policies, the second remedy available is that the claimant
state and breaching state may agree upon "mutually acceptable
compensation."' 166 It is important to note, however, that the payment
of compensation is not mandatory. 167  If compensation is given at
all, 68 it is a result of negotiations between the states.' 69 Finally, if
the offending state is unwilling to comply with the WTO ruling, and
the two states cannot agree on compensation, then the final remedy
available is that the claimant state may suspend a trade concession
against the breaching state "equivalent to the level of the nullification
or impairment."'
170
Although these remedies are available equally to all members of
the WTO, there is good reason to believe that they disadvantage
small states.' 71 For starters, the relatively small market share of
developing states means that developed states face only the prospect
165 See Phoenix X.F. Cai, Making WTO Remedies Work for Developing
Nations: The Need for Class Actions, 25 EMORY INT'L L. REV. 151, 167 (2011). "If
a panel or Appellate Body report finds a measure to be inconsistent with WTO
rules, the offending member must 'bring the measure into conformity' with its
WTO obligations." Id. See also DSU, supra note 164, at art. 19(1).
166 DSU, supra note 164, at art. 22(2).
167 See Shaffer, supra note 115, at 37.
168 See William J. Davey, Compliance Problems in WTO Dispute Settlement,
42 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 119, 122 (2009) (noting that compensation has only been
used once since the creation of the WTO).
169 For a discussion of the difficulties in agreeing on compensation, see Cai,
supra note 165, at 172.
170 DSU, supra note 165, at art. 22(4).
171 See, e.g., Bryan Mercurio, Why Compensation Cannot Replace Trade
Retaliation in the WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding, 8 WORLD TRADE REV.
315, 318 (2009). "The problem of increased tariff levels as retaliation is
particularly troublesome for smaller developing country Members, who more often
than not depend upon one (larger developed) country for a large percentage of their
total trade and rely upon imports for both consumer goods and necessary imports."
Id. For a discussion of the development of the DSU and how it relates to
developing countries, see Amin Alavi, African Countries and the WTO's Dispute
Settlement Mechanism, 25 DEv. POL'Y REV. 25, 26-30 (2007).
EQUALITY, JUSTICE & THE WTO
of weak retaliation. 172 The result is that even if a powerful state
receives an adverse ruling in the WTO, it knows that if it does not
come into compliance or offer compensation, it will not face many
consequences.173  When the weaker state does impose retaliatory
tariffs against a developed county, it often stands to suffer more than
the country that was found to be in breach. 174 This is because if the
developing country relies on imports from the developed state, it
simply is forcing its citizens to pay a higher price for goods without
imposing a meaningful cost on the violating state. Finally,
developing states run the risk that even if they are able to force a
more powerful state to comply with its WTO obligations in an
individual case, they still face the risk of retribution in some other
form. 175 This could include the reduction of economic aid or the
withdrawal of another preferential agreement. 76  Given these
concerns, developing countries are often discouraged from bringing
enforcement actions, and when they do elect to pursue a complaint,
they face considerable obstacles to gaining effective relief.
177
Given the disadvantages the current system poses to developing
states, there are a number of reforms that could be made to the
172 See Shaffer, supra note 115, at 38. See also Chad P. Bown, Developing
Countries as Plaintiffs and Defendants in GATT/7O Trade Disputes, 27 WORLD
ECON. 59 (2004).
173 See generally Bown, supra note 103.
174 See Mercurio, supra note 171, at 318 (noting that "both trading partners
understand that retaliation will likely harm the smaller partner more than it harms
the larger partner").
175 See Bown & Hoekman, supra note 140, at 866.
176 Joseph Francois et al., Trading Profiles and Developing Country
Participation in the WTO Dispute Settlement System, 730 (Stockholm Research
Institute of Industrial Economics, Working Paper 2007) (finding that countries that
are dependent on bilateral aid from another country are less likely to be engaged in
trade disputes). See also Horn et al., supra note 110, at 454. "[S]mall developing
countries may exercise self-constraint in picking their fights in order not to
jeopardize privileges they depend on, for example, development aid and unilateral
trade preferences." Id.
177 See Horn et al., supra note 110, at 454. "[Slmall countries may be
discouraged from bringing complaints if their prospects of enforcing rulings in
their favor are bleak because of limited retaliatory power." Id. See also Busch &
Reinhardt, supra note 98, at 720.
2012]
322 INTERCULTURAL HUMANRIGHTS LAWREVIEW [Vol.7
remedies available in the WTO to increase fairness. First, the
WTO could use payment of fines as a prospective remedy.' 79 Under
this proposal, if the DSU process resulted in a ruling that a state was
not meeting its obligations and the state subsequently failed to bring
its policies into compliance, it could be forced to pay the
complainant state in exchange for its continued violation. 80  A
number of governments have also expressed their support for
awarding this form of financial compensation for violations of WTO
rules.' 81 A second modification that has been proposed is the
payment of retrospective damages.182 This modification would not
only give developing states a greater incentive to enforce their rights
through the dispute settlement process, but it could also increase
their capacity to do so because the possibility of retrospective
damages could lead to experienced law firms agreeing to take on the
cases of developing countries on a contingency basis.183 Finally, a
third way to reform the WTO remedy structure to increase the rights
of developing states would be to make the payment of attorney's fees
included as part of the decision when a complaint is successful.
184
This proposal would further reduce the incentive for rich countries to
178 For an extensive list of articles discussing reform proposals to reform the
remedies system of the WTO, see Trachtman, supra note 164, at 127 n.3.
179 See Shaffer, supra note 115, at 41-43.
180 On our earlier distinction, this remedies proposal might seem to be a
change in the formal rights of member states, rather than an informal change in
means available to navigate the system. Although this is correct, we do not see a
reason to fear that this type of change would incur the costs associated with formal
changes, such as burdensome increases in the complexity or difficulty of bringing
cases within the WTO.
181 See Tractman, supra note 164, at 162 n.167 (citing Communication from
Pakistan to the General Council, Preparations for the 1999 Ministerial
Conference-The Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU), WT/GC/W/162 (Apr.
1, 1999)). See also Shaffer, supra note 115, 41-42.
182 See Shaffer, supra note 115, at 43-44.
183 See id. at 43. It is worth noting that the reason that this benefit does not
necessarily occur with prospective damages is because if a complaint is successful,
the respondent state could simply decide to alter their policies instead of paying
damages for future behavior.
'84 See id. at 43-48 (offering a range of justifications for this policy due to its
potential to help developing states protect their rights).
EQUALITY, JUSTICE & THE WTO
drag out cases to exploit their advantage in resources. Although
there are concerns that may militate against any of these proposals,'
85
they deserve strong consideration as ways to help improve the
distributive justice of the WTO.
C. Making Countermeasures Tradable
In addition to expanding the set of permissible remedies to
include mandatory financial compensation, there is reform that has
been proposed in recognition of the fact that, because of disparities in
market size, it does not make sense for a country with a small market
to even request to impose countermeasures against a violator. 186 One
idea originally proposed by Mexico is to allow members who won
claims the ability to trade the right to impose countermeasures.
187
The rationale is that a state that brought a successful complaint in the
WTO might not be able to successfully use the right to enforce
countermeasures, 188  and thus cannot successfully gain any
compensation for having their exports blocked from foreign markets.
There may be, however, other states that would be better situated to
take advantage of the right to retaliate, and thus a market could be
created for that right to ensure that the violator could not act with
185 For arguments against reforming the remedies available in the WTO, see
Jide Nzelibe, The Case Against Reforming the WTO Enforcement Mechanism,
2008 U. ILL. L. REV. 319 (2008). See also Mercurio, supra rote 171.
186 See Kyle Bagwell et al., The Case for Tradable Remedies in WTO Dispute
Settlement, in ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND MULTILATERAL TRADE
COOPERATION 395 (Evenett & Hoekman eds., 2006).
187 See Proposal by Mexico, Negotiations on Improvements and Clarifications
of the Dispute Settlement Understanding, TNiDS/W/23 (Nov. 4, 2002).
The suspension of concessions phase poses a practical problem
for the Member seeking to apply such suspension. That Member
may not be able to find a trade sector or agreement in respect of
which the suspension of concessions would bring about
compliance without affecting its own interests .... There may
be other Members, however, with the capacity to effectively
suspend concessions to the infringing Member. Id. at 5.
188 See supra text accompanying notes 171-77.
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There have been at least four benefits identified with creating a
system that allows states who have won favorable judgments in the
DSU process to auction the right to retaliate. 190 First, it would
improve the bargaining power of weaker states during all stages of
WTO litigation because of the increased costs that could be
associated with adverse judgments. 191 Second, since developing
states that have had their rights violated are often unable to retaliate
themselves, it would more fairly compensate them by providing a
financial gain.' 92 Third, the incentive for developed states to comply
with WTO policies would be increased because those states would
face the threat of more effective retaliation. 193 Fourth, there would
be increased efficiency in the system because the right to retaliate
would be moved to the state that valued it the most. 1
94
D. Summary
These are mere sketches of proposals for promoting
procedural equality. They share in common the aim of enabling poor
countries to use the legal system provided by the WTO more
effectively. Hopefully, they would enable non-participating poor
countries to acquire the capacity (and recognize the viability of
exercising the capacity) to make claims against richer, more
powerful states. Moreover, there is strong social scientific evidence
that suggests capacity is more important than power in deciding
whether to file. 195 Given the distributional significance of the WTO
189 For a discussion of the various ways this proposal could be implemented,
and the tradeoffs associated with it, see Bagwell et al., supra note 129. For a
discussion of the potential limits associated with creating these auctions, see
Trachtman, supra note 164, at 155-56.
190 See generally Bagwell et al., supra note 129, at 310.
191 See id
192 See Proposal by Mexico, supra note 187, at 6.
193 Id.
194 Bagwell et al., supra note 129, at 310.
195 See Davis & Bermeo, supra note 99. See also Andrew Guzman & Beth
Simmons, To Settle or Empanel? An Empirical Analysis of Litigation and
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procedures, we might expect that these reforms would also increase
the substantive equality in how the benefits of trade liberalization are
distributed. But as argued in Part II, the moral value of substantive
equality is, in this context, uncertain. More pressing is the obligation
to protect weaker parties from wrongful treatment by others. The
social scientific evidence suggests that proposals like the ones we
have discussed will help to provide equal access to the WTO's
procedures. In this way, the proposals could help to deny powerful
states the ability to coerce, deceive or manipulate weaker actors into
doing the bidding of the rich. If this hypothesis is right, equality is
morally important as a means of preventing morally wrong actions.
Equality also protects the weak from the risk of future wrongdoing,
which would otherwise be present in the legal system. This account
is egalitarian because it treats equality as a political concern. We
morally ought to bring about procedures that recognize the equal
status of members. However, it does not locate the moral importance
of this value in equality's intrinsic features. Rather, the account
offered here is a species of a non-intrinsic egalitarian view,
according to which equality is valuable for the sake of something
else.196 In this case, equality is instrumentally valuable in securing a
more just order within the WTO.
We should also emphasize that the institutional criticisms and
recommendations offered here are provisional. Questions of
institutional reform are freighted with empirical controversy.
Whether any given reform ought to be adopted requires an all things
considered judgment informed by the social sciences. Our hope
throughout has been to point out a few normative considerations that
bear on the question, and then conjecture about what reforms these
considerations would weigh in favor of, provided a few empirical
assumptions are true. So, the point we mean to underscore is that the
conclusions offered here should be read as defeasible in light of
opposing social scientific evidence.
Settlement at the World Trade Organization, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. 205 (2002).
196 On non-intrinsic egalitarianism, see O'Neill, supra note 8.
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VI. Conclusion
The purpose of this paper has been to move from an abstract
conclusion about the political importance of equality to a more
determinate conclusion about how the value of equality should guide
international institutions like the WTO. The abstract conclusion was
that equality ought to be a political concem in some intemational
institutions, like the WTO, in roughly the same way that it is a
political concern in domestic political states. As such, it counts as a
form of cosmopolitanism. We have argued that the cosmopolitan
imperative is best understood as procedural rather than substantive,
and that those procedural reforms will be best that prevent future
wrongdoing by agents with the institutions. So equality is valuable
in a procedural and instrumental way. We have further suggested
that informal changes enabling poor countries to use the system
better are likely preferable to altering the WTO's legal system, itself.
Our use of the WTO has been primarily illustrative, and we have not
meant to suggest that we can apply these lessons to other institutions
without a detailed investigation of the empirical facts about those
specific institutions.
In one sense, these results are not surprising. The moral
cosmopolitan's pressure for institutional reform echoes calls for
reform already on the table from social scientists, international
lawyers, and trade ministries from the developing world. The
practical advantage of these proposals is that it is clear how they
would be implemented: they require only modifying presently
existing institutions, and sometimes not even that. Merely securing
greater equality in access to presently existing institutions could be
enough to satisfy the demands of justice. An important consequence
is that justice is an idea that is attainable in the actual world. And we
do not even need a detour through injustice to get there.' 97
It is in this sense the institutional prescriptions offered here
are actually quite startling. They contrast sharply with extant
cosmopolitan proposals forwarded by philosophers. Many
197 Cf Nagel, supra note 1, at 145-47.
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cosmopolitan philosophers of global justice see the current global
order as either in need of drastic overhaul, or else hopelessly unjust.
Philosophy points a way toward a better, if distant world. On the
view developed here, philosophy does not so much cast a light
toward a distant ideal of justice as much as follow along with the
practical proposals made by others. In fact, some of the reforms
suggested here are not even opposed by powerful states in the
developed world. 198  This is not to deny the existence of dire
humanitarian problems in other comers of the world, nor to doubt the
need to call attention to such problems. But it does strike one note of
optimism. The concern for justice is not a concern had only among
philosophers, but it is a concern motivating policy practitioners as
well. The course of international institutions, like the WTO, seems
to be sensitive to the requirements of justice. There is reason to hope
that the moral arc of these institutions is, at the least, toward
progress. 199
198 For example, Shaffer has noted that in some cases the United States has
supported the use of remedies that he favors. See Shaffer, supra note 115, at 42.
199 Cf Joshua Cohen, The Arc of the Moral Universe, 26 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 91
(1997); Peter Railton, Moral Realism, 95 PHIL. REV. 163 (1986).
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